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NO. 37 JUNE 2021 Introduction 
Measuring the Maghreb 
What Do Rankings and Indexes Really Tell Us? 
Aljoscha Albrecht and Isabelle Werenfels 
International rankings and indexes, such as the World Press Freedom Index pub-
lished in mid-April 2021, are increasingly influential in the Maghreb. The region’s 
governments promote improvements in their own performance, protest where they 
score poorly, and celebrate outranking their rivals. Rankings also allow opposition 
groups and activists to spotlight grievances in their own country. External coopera-
tion partners, above all the European Union (EU) and its member states, use them as 
a basis for decision making and policies towards Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. While 
rankings and indexes insinuate objectivity and comparability, their sources, validity 
and utilisation are frequently problematic. Only if they are embedded in qualitative 
research on the Maghreb and their downsides reflected can they make a meaningful 
contribution to identifying reform needs and addressing deficits. 
 
When the latest World Press Freedom Index 
(PFI) came out in April 2021, it made head-
lines in the Maghreb and was picked up by 
prominent government critics. At the same 
time, the Maghreb states’ press agencies 
cite rankings and indexes to highlight their 
neighbours’ deficits: While the Moroccan 
state press agency points to the PFI to un-
derline the lack of press freedom in Algeria, 
its Algerian counterpart prefers to publicise 
Algeria’s own position in the United 
Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) 
Human Development Index (HDI). 
The March 2021 Freedom in the World 
Index (FWI) created similar waves, as did 
the January 2021 Corruption Perceptions 
Index (CPI). The latter was eagerly awaited 
and immediately politically exploited, with 
the Tunisian press celebrating the country’s 
best positioning in a decade, the Moroccan 
and Algerian media each pointing to the 
other’s poor score. 
Other, newer, indexes have also become 
touchstones. These include the Bertelsmann 
Transformation Index (BTI), the Democracy 
Index of the Economist Intelligence Unit 
(EIU) and the World Bank’s Ease of Doing 
Business Index. They play a growing role 
in foreign and security as well as economic 
and development policy, including in sig-
nificant country analyses of the German 
Ministry for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (BMZ), in status reports of 
the European Commission on the European 
Neighbourhood Policy, for example 
on Algeria, and in mandatory Sustainability 
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Impact Assessments, which the EU requires 
for new trade agreements, specifically 
with Morocco and Tunisia. 
What all these rankings and indexes 
have in common is their claim to provide 
reliable objective assessments. Closer ex-
amination of these instruments and their 
application in the Maghreb context reveals 
how unrealistic that is in practice. 
The Maghreb in Figures 
The position of the three Maghreb states 
in the 35 rankings and indexes selected for -
this analysis largely mirrors their geograph-
ical location – between Europe and Sub-
Saharan Africa, and thus between the ex-
tremes of the respective scales. In other 
words, the instruments reflect the inequality 
gradient between “the West”, the Maghreb 
states on its “threshold” and the “Global 
South”. Almost half the rankings that com-
pare internationally place all three Magh-
reb states in the middle third. None have 
all three in the bottom third, while only 
the Global Militarisation Index (GMI) by the 
Bonn International Center for Conversion 
(BICC) and Arton Capital’s Passport Index 
see all three in the top third. The Mo Ibra-
him Foundation’s Ibrahim Index of African 
Governance (IIAG) indicates that the Magh-
reb is ahead in the regional context, placing 
all three Maghreb states in the top third of 
its ranking of 54 African countries. 
A direct comparison between the Magh-
reb states also reveals a clear pattern of 
strengths and weaknesses: Tunisia does best 
overall, Algeria worst, Morocco is in the 
middle. 
Democratic Front Runner Tunisia 
Tunisia comes out first of the three Magh-
reb states in more than half the examined 
rankings and indexes, scoring especially 
well in the areas of statehood and human 
and civil rights. It performs exceptionally 
well in indexes assessing political systems, 
freedoms and governance (see Table 1). 
This applies for example to the BTI, which 
covers “political transformation”, “economic 
transformation” and “governance”. Algeria 
and Morocco lag far behind. Tunisia comes 
fourth overall in the IIAG ranking of Afri-
can states, behind only the island states of 
Mauritius, Cape Verde and the Seychelles. 
Its public sector also makes a relatively 
solid impression in the CPI. 
Nevertheless, the democracy assessments 
do also reveal deficits. The BTI classifies 
Tunisia as a “defective democracy” with a 
“limited” economic transformation and 
“moderate” governance performance. The 
EIU’s Democracy Index confirms the first 
point, classifying the country as a “flawed 
democracy”. All the same, Tunisia rates as 
the only democracy in the Maghreb. 
The human and civil rights situation is 
similar. In the FWI, which rates “political 
rights” and “civil liberties”, Tunisia scores 
71/100; neither Morocco nor Algeria even 
manage 40 (see Table 1). Tunisia is thus the 
only Maghreb state that Freedom House 
judges “free” and in addition the only Arab 
state and one of only five African states. 
The FWI classes Morocco as “partly free” 
(but without Western Sahara), Algeria as 
“not free”. Tunisia is also well ahead of 
Morocco and Algeria in the PFI – despite 
having once occupied, with 164th place in 
2010, the lowest position of any Maghreb 
state since the PFI was first created in 2002. 
Tunisia also leads on visa-free travel and 
academic freedom. According to Henley & 
Partners Tunisians can travel visa-free to 
72 countries, and Tunisia is the best-placed 
Maghreb country in Arton Capital’s Pass-
port Index. It does especially well in the 
Academic Freedom Index (AFi) by Berlin-
based Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi) 
where it is the only Maghreb state in the 
best of the five categories. This is also re-
flected in its top placing in the UNDP’s 
Global Knowledge Index (GKI). Tunisia also 
leads the Maghreb in the Digital Quality of 
Life Index (DQL Index). 
The same cannot be said of security 
and conflict potential. To its credit Tunisia 
comes last among Maghreb states in both 
the GMI and the Fragile States Index (FSI) – 
meaning it is the least fragile and the least 
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militarised. Less positively, it leads Algeria 
and Morocco in the Global Terrorism Index 
(GTI), which measures the “impacts of ter-
rorism” in terms of incidents, fatalities, 
injuries and property damage. Tunisia also 
fares worse than Morocco on the Political 
Terror Scale (PTS) and in the Global Peace 
Index (GPI), which aggregates “domestic and 
international conflict”, “safety and security” 
and “militarisation”. 
Tunisia’s worst deficits are found in the 
economic sphere, where the free-market 
poster child Morocco sweeps the field. 
Economic Champion Morocco 
Morocco is close on Tunisia’s heels overall, 
placing first of the three Maghreb states 
in 14 of the 35 rankings and indexes. The 
kingdom has a clear lead in the economic 
indexes, coming 53rd of 190 countries in 
the World Bank’s prominent Ease of Doing 
Business Index, thus outclassing Tunisia by 
25 places and Algeria by 104. 
The positive assessment of Morocco as a 
place to do business is attributable above all 
to the indicators “dealing with construction 
permits” (16th), “paying taxes” (24th) und 
“getting electricity” (34th). Morocco’s com-
petitiveness is further underlined by the 
World Economic Forum’s Global Competi-
tiveness Index (GCI), where it lies 12 places 
ahead of Tunisia and 14 ahead of Algeria 
(see Table 2). Morocco also holds a clear 
lead on budgetary transparency, economic 
freedom and connectivity: In the Open 
Budget Index (OBI) it holds 62nd place, 20 
ahead of Tunisia and 50 ahead of Algeria. 
The gaps are even bigger in the Heritage 
Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom 
and Brand Finance’s Global Soft Power 
Index. Morocco is also best of the three in 
ETH Zürich’s KOF Globalisation Index, 
in which the “economic globalisation” com-
ponent accounts for one-third. 
Morocco leads on ecological sustainabil-
ity, taking seventh place of the 57 countries 
ranked in the Climate Change Performance 
Index (CCPI). In reality that means fourth 
because its creator, the environmental NGO 
Germanwatch, demonstratively leaves the 
first three places unfilled. In contrast Alge-
ria’s extensive oil and gas industry leaves 
it at the bottom of the list (43rd). Morocco 
also does passably in Dual Citizen’s Global 
Green Economy Index (GGEI), coming 59th 
of 130. 
In Yale University’s renowned Environ-
mental Performance Index (EPI) it scores 
considerably less well. Here Morocco comes 
100th of 180 countries, behind Tunisia (71st) 
and even Algeria (84th). The main reason 
for this is that the index also includes the 
development-related category “environmen-
tal health”, in which Algeria is 61st overall 
and best in the Maghreb. And although 
Morocco leads the Maghreb in the economic 
indexes, the BTI includes a pointer suggest-
ing that its lead is not unassailable: The Ber-
telsmann Stiftung regards Morocco’s “eco-
Table 1 
Democracy, freedom, corruption 
Index Tunisia Morocco Algeria 
Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) 44th of 137 94th 83rd 
EIU Democracy Index 54th of 165 96th 115th 
Freedom in the World Index (FWI) 71/100 (“free”) 37/100 (“partly free”) 32/100 (“not free”) 
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) 69th of 180 86th 104th 
World Press Freedom Index (PFI) 73rd of 180 136th 146th 
Sources: Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2020; The Economist Intelligence Unit, Democracy Index 
2020; Freedom House, FWI 2021; Transparency International, CPI 2020; Reporters sans frontières, PFI 
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nomic transformation” as “limited”, putting 
it 62nd, 17 places behind Tunisia. 
Laggard Algeria 
Overall Algeria lags far behind; in just three 
of the 35 investigated rankings and indexes 
does it come ahead of Tunisia and Morocco, 
namely the GMI, the Human Capital Index 
(HCI) and the HDI. Especially noteworthy 
are Algeria’s good showings in the HCI, 
introduced by the World Bank in 2018 to 
assess how well countries are harnessing 
the economic potential of their citizens, 
and in the UNDP’s HDI. Algeria’s perfor-
mance in the HCI is not exactly spectacu-
lar – 98th of 174 – but still ahead of the 
other two Maghreb states, particularly 
in the education components: on average 
Algerians attend school for more than 
a year longer than their Tunisian and 
Moroccan peers. 
Where the Maghreb’s largest state really 
stands out is the HDI (see Table 3), where it 
comes third in Africa (after Mauritius and 
the Seychelles). Since 2010 the HDI com-
prises “life expectancy at birth”, “expected” 
and “mean years of schooling” and “gross 
national income (GNI) per capita”. Algeria 
scores better than the other two in three 
indicators, but the one that stands out most 
is per capita GNI. This is especially signifi-
cant because the Cost of Living Index attri-
butes Algeria a lower cost of living than 
Morocco, which Numbeo calculates as hav-
ing the highest in the Maghreb. 
However, Algerian women appear to 
profit less than their male compatriots from 
the country’s development successes. Both 
UNDP gender indexes reveal significant 
deficits in Algerian gender parity. Algeria 
receives the worst possible rating in the 
Gender Development Index (GDI) and places 
103rd of 162 in the Gender Inequality Index 
(GII). That said, neither Tunisia still less Mo-
rocco do especially well in this area either. 
Despite Algeria’s decent showing in 
certain development-related areas, there is 
no denying that it comes last of the three 
Maghreb states in more than two-thirds of 
the quantitative instruments overall. And 
it has most catching up to do in the fields 
where Tunisia and Morocco do best: state-
hood, human and civil rights, and econom-
ic and technological development. Algeria 
is the weakest of the Maghreb states in the 
DQL Index (and second-last of all the 85 
included countries). The same also applies 
to the EF English Proficiency Index. 
Finally, Algeria also gives cause for con-
cern in the sphere of security and conflict 
potential. The FSI rates it as the most fragile 
Maghreb state (and 71st of 178 overall), the 
GPI as the least peaceful (117th of 163) and 
the GMI as by far the most militarised 
(see Table 3). 
Table 2 
Economics and climate 
Index Tunisia Morocco Algeria 
Ease of Doing Business Index 78th 53rd of 190 157th 
Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) 87th 75rd of 141 89th 
Index of Economic Freedom 119th 81st of 178 162nd 
Climate Change Performance Index (CCPI) n/a 7th of 57 43rd 
Sources: World Bank, Ease of Doing Business Index 2020; World Economic Forum, GCI 
2019; Heritage Foundation, Index of Economic Freedom 2021; Germanwatch, CCPI 2021. 
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The Downsides: Plausibility 
Problems of Rankings and Indexes 
At first glance these rankings and indexes 
might appear to create a largely plausible 
profile of the Maghreb states and their 
relative international and regional status 
that tallies with qualitative observations. 
Closer examination reveals the downsides: 
These revolve around questions of con-
sistency between instruments and compati-
bility with the findings of qualitative 
research, spanning the entire process from 
methodological issues to potential uses and 
general validity. 
Methodological Question Marks 
Comparison of different indexes and rank-
ings operating in the same or very similar 
areas quickly raises multiple questions 
concerning their design. Take for example 
the area of development: Algeria leads the 
Maghreb in the HDI on the basis of educa-
tion and a rentier state based on oil and gas 
wealth. What the HDI fails to pick up is the 
development realities on the ground and 
especially the opportunities associated – in 
an age of global connectivity and digitalisa-
tion – more with English language skills 
and access to high-speed internet than with 
traditional schooling. Those are areas where 
Morocco and especially Tunisia do better. 
Although Algeria leads in the HDI, Tunisia 
does considerably better in five other devel-
opment-related indexes (and Morocco in 
four): As well as the two UNDP gender in-
dexes (excepting Morocco in the GII) this 
also applies to the Global Hunger Index 
(GHI), the GKI and the DQL Index. 
Even greater contradictions appear among 
the rankings of political freedom and classi-
fications of political systems. The BTI clas-
sifies Algeria as a “moderate autocracy”, 
Morocco considerably less favourably as a 
“hard-line autocracy”. The EIU’s Democracy 
Index on the other hand classes Morocco as 
a “hybrid regime”, Algeria as an “authori-
tarian regime”. The FWI also regards Morocco 
(“partly free”) as much “freer” than Algeria 
(“not free”). One obvious explanation for 
such discrepancies would be different 
underlying understandings of democracy. 
But in fact both the Bertelsmann Stiftung 
and the EIU base their work on five broadly 
congruent criteria. 
This would suggest that even minor 
deviations in individual criteria, their oper-
ationalisation, standardisation and weight-
ing, can cause wide divergences or even 
contradictions in the classifications. In 
effect, the instruments selected by Euro-
pean and other external cooperation part-
ners ultimately decide how a state is judged. 
With regard to cooperation projects – 
whether economic or developmental in 
nature – it certainly does make a differ-
ence whether a state is regarded as an 
“authoritarian regime” or a “moderate 
autocracy” (example Algeria). In Morocco’s 
case the spectrum is especially broad, with 
partners able to choose between a “hybrid 
Table 3 
Development and militarisation 
Index Tunisia Morocco Algeria 
Human Development Index (HDI) 95th 121st 91st of 189 
Human Capital Index (HCI) 102nd 110th 98th of 174 
Global Militarisation Index (GMI) 47th 23rd 15th of 151 
Sources: UNDP, HDI 2020; World Bank, HCI 2020; Bonn International Center for Conver-
sion, GMI 2019. 
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regime” and a “hard-line autocracy” as the 
basis for developing policies, making deci-
sions and tailoring justifications. This illus-
trates the danger inherent to quantitative 
instruments: They insinuate comprehensive 
objectivity and precise measurement. It 
tends to get forgotten that their subjectivity 
begins with those who design them, and 
that judgements are already being made in 
the process of designing the instruments. 
And if the indicators are then applied 
selectively or instrumentalised, the result is 
frequently a simplistic and distorted image 
of a considerably more complex reality – 
and in the worst case policies based on false 
assumptions. For example Morocco’s rela-
tively uncritical elevation to a “darling” of 
international donors and investors over the 
past decade, alongside Tunisia, is likely 
attributable in part to its improving rank-
ings. The danger here is that governments 
may tend to design reforms to optimise 
their rankings rather than enhancing their 
actual performance. Comparisons over time 
should also be treated with caution because 
improvements in rankings do not necessarily 
indicate progress. They can result simply 
from deterioration elsewhere, and vice 
versa of course. 
Further problems include the difficulty 
of data gathering in authoritarian states, 
and outdated data or estimates underlying 
certain indexes; these include the 
UNDP’s Multidimensional Poverty Index 
(MPI) and Gender Social Norms Index 
(GSNI). 
Flawed Comparisons and 
Blind Spots 
A comparison with the qualitative litera-
ture introduces another set of problems. 
For instance, political freedom indexes tend 
to obscure the nature of the underlying sys-
tems. The examples of Morocco and Algeria 
illustrate the difficulties of placing coun-
tries with very different political systems 
on a single scale. One is ruled by a monarch 
with a firm hand and almost absolute con-
stitutional power. The other is a highly 
opaque system controlled by competing 
actors primarily from the military, operat-
ing behind the scenes via clientelistic 
networks. 
Both systems are equally problematic 
for political activists. The Algerian possibly 
more so, as restricted access for inter-
national human rights organisations can 
result in information deficits for example 
on torture. So the question of which system 
deserves to be labelled as more “authoritar-
ian” is debatable. Such judgements are 
potentially crucial for the Maghreb govern-
ments, because of their repercussions for 
international agreements and cooperation. 
The aforementioned analyses and reports 
on which the German government and the 
European Commission base their decisions 
fail to address this aspect. 
Ultimately, the comparability of such 
structurally very different economies is very 
limited. How to meaningfully compare a 
rentier economy like Algeria with diversi-
fied systems like Tunisia or Morocco? 
Morocco’s economy is strongly regulated – 
one could say dominated – by the royal 
family, and is more attractive to foreign 
investors, especially from Europe. But 
the royal family’s economic monopoly, as 
well as the corruption in public administra-
tion, are detrimental to the domestic 
private sector with less good connections to 
the royal court. In other words, the local 
perspective on Morocco’s good showing in 
the Ease of Doing Business Index will be 
different and more sceptical. This is 
underlined by a comparison with other 
business indexes: Morocco lags far behind 
Tunisia in the BTI component “economic 
transformation”, which unlike the World 
Bank index includes criteria like “social 
security and compensation”, “equality of 
opportunity” and “sustainability”. 
Concentrating exclusively on rankings 
risks oversimplification, because many of 
the Maghreb states’ profound problems are 
difficult or impossible to grasp quantitatively. 
For example, the individual indicators that 
form the instruments cannot comprehend 
phenomena such as informality and politi-
cal parallel structures (the “deep state”). 
That is simply outside the scope of the 
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quantitative approach. Even if the CPI does 
represent an effort to address these issues, it 
is still quantifying corruption as perceived 
by a section of the business elites rather 
than the experience across society. Nor do 
the bare numbers reveal much about the 
quality and structures of corruption. Con-
sequently, rankings and indexes supply 
little or no meaningful basis for determin-
ing what kind of reforms would be needed. 
The same can be said about the GMI. It 
measures a country’s militarisation but 
says nothing about actual or intended use 
of armed force, nor about the relationship 
between military and society. Is a country 
militarising because the monarch wishes it 
to (Morocco), or has the military long been 
operating outside of (or even controlling) 
politics (Algeria)? The indexes reveal little 
or nothing about the actors, whose quali-
tative nature largely precludes quantitative 
analysis. 
No less problematic is the loss of local 
detail. The blind spots include intra-national 
differences in poverty and unemployment – 
for example in Morocco between the eco-
nomic centres of Casablanca and Rabat and 
the marginalised Rif, or in Tunisia between 
the affluent Tunis suburb of La Marsa 
and disadvantaged regions like Tataouine 
and Jendouba. It is a real question whether 
it would not be more productive to gather 
detailed data on regions and actors – for 
example on the performance of political 
parties, ministries and political functions 
such as head of state – rather painting a 
whole country with the same broad brush. 
Furthermore, in almost all cases (CPI 
apart) it remains unclear whether the coun-
try’s citizens share the assessment. Accord-
ing to surveys from 2020 the authoritarian 
regimes of Morocco and Algeria enjoy a 
great deal more public confidence than 
Tunisia’s democratically elected govern-
ment. 
Added Value and 
Recommendations 
The weaknesses illustrated by the example 
of the Maghreb states demonstrate the 
ambivalence of rankings and indexes. Un-
reflected application can lead to problematic 
assessments and decisions. But rankings 
and indexes can contribute to identifying 
reform needs and rectifying deficits, from 
which both the Maghreb states themselves 
and their external cooperation partners 
stand to benefit. This makes it all the more 
important that the German government 
and the European Commission are aware 
of the weaknesses of the instruments they 
use. Otherwise the risk is that they will, as 
Alexander Cooley and Jack Snyder put 
it, “dumb down global governance”. 
The following points should be observed: 
Generating a comprehensive understanding 
requires holistic and prudent consideration 
of different rankings and indexes and aware-
ness of their contradictions. Even then they 
certainly cannot substitute the profound 
knowledge of the local context that is a 
precondition for identifying omissions and 
distortions, avoiding misconceptions and 
identifying the real causes of grievances. 
The extent to which it is useful or legiti-
mate to compare states with fundamentally 
different priors is also an issue policy 
makers should carefully scrutinise in each 
case. If we are to draw conclusions about 
the validity of rankings and indexes we 
must also factor in their origins and compo-
sition. These include the selected criteria, 
their operationalisation and weighting, the 
data sources and the collection methods. 
Not least, it is worth taking a look at the 
funding, interests and worldviews of the in-
stitutions producing them. 
Aljoscha Albrecht is Research Assistant in the Middle East and Africa Division at SWP. 
Dr Isabelle Werenfels is Senior Fellow in the Middle East and Africa Division at SWP. 
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